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Abstract: Biodiesel from jatropha has been considered as a promising alternative to fossil 
fuels for some time. Consequently, China started promoting jatropha as one of the options 
to meet its ever-increasing energy consumption, and the Chinese biodiesel industry also 
gained interest. However, the excitement of the biofuel industry in jatropha faded after it 
did not bring about the expected results. This article investigates the stagnation in jatropha 
development and production for biodiesel in China, using two detailed case studies of 
jatropha biofuel production in southeast China. It is found that the underdeveloped 
biodiesel policy and regulation, such as a rather late formulation of standards for biodiesel 
(especially the B5) and the absence of mandatory targets, is an important reason for 
hampering jatropha development. Besides that, lack of financial support undermined 
sustained jatropha planting at the farm level and lack of sustained commitment from 
state-owned enterprises or private companies over a long time span further contributed to 
jatropha project’s failure. Better implementation of the rule of law, mandatory blending 
requirements, hazard insurance, as well as continuous financial support, might improve the 
continuation of jatropha plantation schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
Global warming, high fossil fuel prices, an increasing alertness for energy security and greater 
recognition of the environmental consequences of fossil fuels create an urgent need to enlarge the 
development of renewable energy sources [1,2]. At the same time, liquid biofuels, as one of these 
renewable energy sources, have attracted criticism, among others regarding their competition with 
food crops for arable land. Policies to promote liquid biofuels have mushroomed worldwide over the 
past decade [3–6]. Like most countries, China has also shown an interest in promoting liquid biofuels 
as one option to diversify energy sources, in order to meet its ever-increasing energy consumption and 
prevent environmental problems related to fossil fuel-based energy use. Owing to China’s limited  
per capita farmland and in the face of potential food security risks and global food price spikes in 
2006–2007, the Chinese government has prohibited the production of biofuels from grain (i.e., corn, 
rice, wheat) and other major food crops. In this situation, biofuel production from oil trees on marginal 
lands appears as a promising alternative [7]. In particular, jatropha (Jatropha curcas L.) is considered  
a promising crop for generating raw material for biodiesel production. The Chinese government  
has consequently started to promote jatropha, with the Chinese biodiesel industry also starting to show 
an interest. 
Jatropha trees produce seeds rich in oil that can be easily converted into biodiesel [8]. The processing 
of the seeds involves low technology and low cost equipment [9]. Ideally, plants should be exposed to 
between 900 and 1200 mm of rainfall per year [10]. They cannot stand frost. Trees are said to be 
vigorous, drought resistant and pest-resistant, as well as being able to grow on marginal land [10], 
which makes them less contested than other energy crops that compete for land, water and nutrients. 
However, jatropha cultivation is labour intensive. Finally, jatropha trees reach full production potential 
in the fifth year and produce seeds for up to 50 years [11]. 
Globally, jatropha trees are planted as both community and large-scale plantations. While community 
plantations have shown signs of success, the “road to large-scale biofuel production for developing 
countries is bumpy” [12]. Moreover, the largest share of investment in biofuel production goes into the 
establishment of large-scale plantations [12]. However, in smallholder contexts of developing 
countries, the implementation of large-scale plantations involves a considerable number of stakeholders 
who need to cooperate for a lengthy duration of time, i.e., from plantation to seed harvesting. Such 
failures of large-scale jatropha projects prompted Kant and Wu [13] to coin the current developments as 
the “collapse of jatropha as a global biofuel”. In China, on the peak of the jatropha biofuel excitement in 
2006, a considerable number of investment projects for the production of jatropha were announced by 
government and state-owned companies. However, since 2008, the great jatropha passion cooled down 
and no significant advances in jatropha biodiesel industry have been reported since then. Few studies have 
looked at the general causes of this failing jatropha biodiesel development, and remained focused on the 
technology dimension. 
Against this background, this article analyses jatropha developments in China in general and 
explores the large-scale planting of jatropha as energy crop for biodiesel production. The study entails 
an analysis of jatropha policy development in China and of two detailed case studies of jatropha 
biofuel production in southeast China. Our central research question is: what are the main institutional 
reasons behind the stagnation of jatropha plantation. More specifically, we concentrate on the different 
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time perspectives of the actors involved and their related behaviour. In this context, “time perspectives” 
are “composite cognitive structures that characterize the way an individual project, collects, accesses, 
values, and organizes events that reside in distinct temporal loci” [14]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, very few studies have considered to what extent and how each of these institutional 
arrangements can help to overcome the differences in time perspectives that we have depicted above. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of Chinese policies 
to promote jatropha and jatropha biodiesel development status. Section 3 discusses the research 
methodology and analytical framework. Section 4 reports on the detailed case studies in Sichuan and 
Guangxi provinces. Section 5 discusses our findings and draws conclusions. 
2. Jatropha Biofuel Development in China 
2.1. China’s Jatropha Biofuel Policy 
As biofuels are new energy sources with currently higher production costs than fossil fuels, most 
governments have heavily supported and subsidised initial liquid biofuel developments [3]. Indeed, 
China has been no exception to this rule, where the cultivation of jatropha has been initiated and 
organised by the central government, while the implementation of specific jatropha projects falls under 
the responsibility of village committees and farmers. The national government has devised a series of 
laws and policies to support and promote jatropha plantations (see Table 1). 
Table 1. National supportive policies for jatropha biofuels (2005–2011). 
Year Name of law/policy Publishing authority * Most relevant content 
2005 
Renewable energy 
industry development 
supervision catalogue 
NDRC 
Support of plantation and better variety 
selection of energy crops including jatropha; 
support of technological research, 
demonstration projects, etc. 
2006 
National energy forest 
construction plan 
SFA 
Planting target for 2020: 13 million ha 
energy forests including jatropha with supply 
of raw material for 6 million ton biodiesel 
and 15 million watt electricity. 
2006 
“The Eleventh Five-Year” 
construction scheme  
for oil-bearing energy 
forest base 
SFA 
Planting target of the eleventh five-year plan 
(2006–2010): 400,000 ha jatropha in 
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and 433,000 ha 
other oil-bearing forest. 
2006 
Interim instrument on 
Renewable Energy 
Development  
Special Fund 
MOF 
Special fund provided by central government 
for, among others, biodiesel from seeds; 
Regulation of procedures of application  
and approval, financial management  
and monitoring;  
Subsidy standard of 3000 RMB per ha for 
energy forest including jatropha (conditional 
on contract with pilot company). 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Year Name of law/policy Publishing authority * Most relevant content 
2006 
Implementation guideline 
on financial and tax 
support for renewable 
energy and  
biochemical industry 
MOF 
NDRC 
MOA 
SAT 
SFA 
Introduction of the “Not compete with grain” 
principle and encouragement of the use of 
marginal land;  
Utilisation of jatropha seeds to produce 
biofuels encouraged;  
Financial support (deficiency payment  
for enterprises processing jatropha seeds 
conditional on crude oil price; subsidy  
for energy forests and demonstration plots) 
and tax preferences. 
2007 
Medium-long-term 
development plan on 
renewable energy 
NDRC 
Biodiesel production from energy crops  
as political goal;  
Establishment of jatropha-breeding  
biodiesel experimental projects in  
Sichuan and other provinces;  
Increase of annual target of biodiesel  
use from 200,000 tons (2010) to  
2 million tons (2020);  
Blending targets with liquid biofuel  
for petroleum and diesel. 
2007 
Management instruction 
on financial subsidy 
supporting the crops 
which produce non-grain 
renewable energy and 
biochemical products 
MOF 
Definition of conditions for financial support: 
A refinery and capacity is required to be 
qualified to receive the subsidy;  
More than 20 thousand ha plantation and 
more than 33.3 ha nursery field are required. 
2007 
Biodiesel Blend Stock 
(BD100) for diesel  
engine fuels 
GAQSIQ 
SA 
Setting a quality standard for biodiesel. 
2011 Biodiesel Fuel Blend (B5) 
GAQSIQ 
SA 
2%–5% biodiesel blending with  
95%–98% diesel. 
* NDRC National Development and Reform Committee; MOF Ministry of Finance; MOA Ministry of 
Agriculture; SAT State Administration of Taxation; SFA State Forestry Administration; GAQSIQ General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine; SA Standardisation Administration; Land 
area is given in ha, on the base of the original Chinese unit of mu (15 mu = 1 ha). 
Table 1 shows that a national supportive policy to promote biofuels from jatropha has been developed 
in China, particularly from 2005 onwards. Different governmental agencies have set numerous 
measures to facilitate, stimulate and regulate renewable energy production from jatropha biofuels.  
Five governmental agencies have formulated guidelines for financial support and facilities to stimulate 
liquid biofuel production, namely the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), 
State Administration of Taxation (SAT), National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), and 
State Forestry Administration (SFA). However, these guidelines have not necessarily contributed to 
stable long-term favourable perspectives for jatropha plantations. For instance, SAT’s tax exemption 
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for biodiesel, published in 2005, was already abolished in 2008. In 2007, standards were published for 
biodiesel production. The Biodiesel Blend Stock (BD100, 100% biodiesel) for Diesel Engine Fuels was 
published in 2007, and the biodiesel fuel blend (B5, 5% biodiesel) was published in 2011. In contrast 
to many developed countries, which have created a liquid biofuel market by setting compulsory targets 
for blending, China has no mandatory blending target for biodiesel. Hence, the development of a 
biodiesel industry that is embedded in a robust market environment remains in its infancy [11]. 
2.2. Jatropha Biofuel Projects in China 
Apart from creating a national niche market for jatropha biodiesel, clearly outlined programmes  
and plans can support a convergence of different time perspectives. In The Eleventh Five-Year 
construction scheme for oil-breeding energy forest bases, published by the SFA in 2006, a Forestry-Oil 
Integration (linyou yitihua) Scheme was formulated in which jatropha plantations were to be increased 
in three provinces: Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan [15]. In this plan, an institutional arrangement was 
set up between state-owned oil companies and SFA to promote energy forest plantations and biofuel 
production. CNPC, China’s largest state-owned oil company, first entered in a collaborative relation 
with SFA, with two other major state-owned oil companies, SINOPEC (China Petroleum & Chemical 
Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), later joining this cooperation. 
Following these state-owned companies and further attracted by governmental promotional policies, 
private companies have also become involved in jatropha plantation. 
In China, provinces often complement such national programmes and plans with regulations and 
policies. Sichuan and Guizhou provinces included jatropha promotion in their province-specific 
Eleventh Five-Year Development plan [16,17], aiming for around 600,000 and 400,000 hectares 
planted with jatropha in 2020, respectively [7,15]. Biodiesel industry development from jatropha was 
also written into the No 1 document of Guizhou People’s Government in 2007 [15]. Moreover, besides 
these three provinces, other south-western provinces have also developed policies to stimulate jatropha 
plantation, as well as downstream biodiesel production and use. Therefore, CNPC, SINOPEC, 
CNOOC and other private companies and governmental agencies have built or planned to build many 
jatropha feedstock based projects (see Table 2). 
However, many of the planned projects in Table 2 have not been implemented or were 
discontinued. At the end of 2006, the US Company Beck Ltd withdrew from China, after having 
invested 2.6 million RMB in jatropha plantations. Moreover, the UK Company Sun biofuel left 
Sichuan because the company could not agree with the Panzhihua city government, Sichuan Province, 
about how much it had to invest to continue jatropha production [18]. Various other jatropha projects 
of CNPC, SINOPEC and CNOOC have discontinued and CNPC and CNOOC have stopped investing 
money in jatropha projects [19]. The NDRC project (cf. Table 2) in Guizhou province also did not 
continue after 2008 (interview with scientists and government officers). Moreover, according to 
Hainan Daily [20], the area of jatropha planted decreased between 2009 and 2011 as several private 
companies withdrew.  
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Table 2. Planned and realized jatropha plantation projects and investments in China from 
2006–2008 (own survey, [21]).  
Project name Investment scale Project site Investment (RMB) 
CNPC Jatropha feedstock base 
with Panzhihua Government  
20.0 × 104 ha 
Panzhihua City, 
Sichuan 
2.3 billion  
American Baker biofuel company 
with Panzhihua Government  
20.0 × 104 ha Panzhihua 9.6–12 billion  
Sunshine technology group UK 6.7 × 104 ha Panzhihua 4 billion 
SINOPEC, Panzhihua energy 
forest base and biodiesel refinery 
3.0–3.5 × 104 ha 
Panzhihua City, 
Sichuan 
Unknown 
CNOOC, Panxi Jatropha  
biodiesel industry base 
15.0 × 104 ha 
Panzhihua City, 
Sichuan 
2.347 billion 
CNOOC 6 × 104 ton biodiesel Dongfang, Hainan Unknown 
Hainan CNOOC, New Energy 
Industrial Co., Ltd 
1500 ha Hainan Unknown 
Hainan Honglv Zhengke 
bioenergy development Co. 
8.5 × 104 ha Hainan 53 million 
CNPC jatropha feedstock  
base with State Forestry 
Administration  
(Lincang city, Yunnan province ) 
1 × 104 ha 
Lincang city, 
Yunnan 
Unknown 
Sunshine Technology Group, UK 2.0 × 104 ha 
Red River Basin  
in Yunnan 
Unknown 
Yunnan Shenyu  
new energy group 
2.0 × 104 ha Chuxiong, Yunnan 0.8 billion 
National Development and 
Reform Commission, 
standardized planting  
of jatropha and commercial 
demonstration base 
4.0 × 104 ha Guizhou Unknown 
Liuzhou Minghui Biofuels Co. 30 × 104 ton biodiesel Liuzhou, Guangxi Unknown 
Guangxi Zhilian Renewable 
Energy Company 
3 × 104 ha Pingguo, Guangxi Unknown 
In 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission approved the first three domestic 
Jatropha biodiesel processing demonstration projects: CNPC Nanchong Refinery (60,000 ton/year), 
SINOPEC Guizhou branch (50,000 ton/year) and CNOOC Hainan (60,000 ton/year). Until now, only 
CNOOC Hainan processing project has been built. However, because the jatropha feedstock base has 
not been planted, at present it produced biodiesel mainly from sulphated oil. More than 100 biodiesel 
enterprises are mainly dependent on waste cooking oils and animal fats as feedstock [22]. This is also 
confirmed by the distribution and planted area of jatropha (Table 3).  
The establishment of jatropha plantations started in 2006 on a massive scale mainly in southwest 
China, including the provinces Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi and Hainan [11,21,22].  
Most recently, the jatropha area (including natural forests) covers 200,000 ha. Table 3 presents the 
distribution of areas across the five provinces.  
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Table 3. Area with jatropha in China (data from [21]). 
Province Natural area (×103 ha) Planted area (×103 ha) Planned area (×103 ha) 
Yunnan 33.3 83.3 666.7 
Sichuan 10.3 33.3 666.7 
Guizhou - 15 40 
Hainan - 6.7 200 
Guangxi - 15 - 
In conclusion, until 2013 the production of biodiesel from jatropha remained at the very early stage, 
with current annual yields of biodiesel from crude jatropha oil at less than 100 tonnes [21,22]. 
Inadequate jatropha feedstock supply is considered a major obstacle to jatropha biofuel development 
in China (see Table 3). In understanding why the area of planted jatropha and the supply of feedstock 
to the biodiesel plants are not expanding, in what follows, two cases of large-scale jatropha projects  
are analysed.  
3. Methodology: Case Study and Analytical Framework 
3.1. Case Study 
Case studies are employed to analyse large-scale jatropha projects in China. Case studies prove 
especially valuable when investigating a contemporary complex phenomenon within its real-life 
context, where boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and “how” and 
“why” questions are being asked [23,24].  
Given that case study methodology has limitations in terms of the generalisation of results and 
external validity, the selection of case studies is crucial. In this respect, a two-step selection process 
was undertaken. First, two out of the five Chinese provinces that have favourable conditions for 
jatropha growth and have installed policies to stimulate jatropha plantations were selected. 
Accordingly, Sichuan and Guangxi were chosen, as both provinces are located in southern China and 
have suitable subtropical climatic conditions to grow jatropha. In economic terms, both provinces 
represent provinces with a below average wealth in terms of per capital GDP. This holds for the 
provincial level as well as for rural areas. Sichuan has the second largest area of established jatropha 
plantations in China [22]. Guangxi also has established a fair number of jatropha plantations, but does 
not belong to the initial three provinces of the Forestry-Oil Integration Scheme. 
Second, based on the overview of the jatropha biodiesel projects, two different institutional 
arrangements to establish plantations have been identified thus far. Whereas market driven 
arrangements—whereby farm households cooperate and contract with private companies—appear the 
standard in Western contexts, government driven arrangements with a high involvement of local and 
higher level government offices and state-owned enterprises remain fairly common in China today.  
An example of a government driven jatropha plantation arrangement was selected in Sichuan. From 
2006, mainly government driven projects developed in Sichuan. The government driven project we 
selected is the first project in the Forestry-Oil Integration Scheme, in which the state-owned CNPC 
cooperated with SFA on jatropha. Guangxi has no jatropha projects involving state-owned companies 
with a government driven institutional arrangement. In Guangxi, jatropha plantations are predominantly 
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initiated by private companies and hence are typically market driven institutional arrangements. 
Hence, a case of a market driven institutional arrangement project was selected in Guangxi. As such, 
the two cases are representative for the two institutional arrangements and substantially differ in terms 
of how actor configurations and policies approach the development of jatropha plantation and related 
to liquid biofuels production. 
In each of the two provinces, provincial level representatives of the SFA provided an overview of 
the large-scale jatropha plantation projects that have been initiated in recent years. From their list, one 
project in each of the provinces was selected, based on the criteria of accessibility, available 
information on project implementation and minimum cultivation scale. The fieldwork on the two cases 
was carried out in 2010, using in-depth semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and 
document analysis as the main research methods. Key stakeholders included decision makers from 
four administrative levels, as well as the village committee, scientists and company officials. More 
specifically, interviews were held with officers of the State Forestry Administration in charge of 
energy crops, including jatropha, provincial forestry department officers in charge of jatropha projects, 
county forestry department officers in charge of the jatropha plantation, township forestry officers 
where jatropha was planted, as well as village leaders of villages taking part in the jatropha plantation. 
Moreover, interviews were also conducted with three scientists, one previous staff member of the 
private company, two staff members from the state-owned company, as well as three NGO 
spokespersons. The semi-structured interview was designed by mapping out the relevant actors, 
resources, rules of the game and discourse characteristics around the two jatropha projects [25].  
3.2. Analytical Framework 
Policies and targets as described above need to be implemented by stakeholders on the ground.  
The concepts of institutional arrangements can be applied to analyse such implementation processes. 
Here, “institutional arrangements” are employed in a similar way as Arts et al. [25] using policy 
arrangements, i.e., a temporary stabilised actor network with resource dependencies among the actors 
and specific rules of the game. As briefly mentioned above, we identified two types of jatropha 
institutional arrangements in China: government driven and market driven. The term government 
driven arrangement refers to jatropha plantation projects that are initiated by governmental 
stakeholders, implemented by governmental and/or other stakeholders and in which governmental 
rules play a significant role. The term market driven institutional arrangements refers to plantations 
that are initiated and implemented by market actors such as companies and smallholders, to a major 
extent according to market rules. 
In order to facilitate the development of a project, an institutional arrangement aims at reducing 
uncertainty about future outcomes via three different ways. First, we assume that uncertainty is 
reduced when each actor contributes with resources to the arrangement and rules prevent the 
withdrawal of different stakeholders. Resources can be land, property, seedlings, financial 
credit/support, staff support, knowledge, access to certain actor groups, means of communication, legal 
power, committee membership, and access to market channels [26,27]. Contribution to the jatropha 
project/arrangement with any of these resources shows commitment, but includes vulnerability in case 
the project/agreement fails. Actors are vulnerable to other actors withdrawing their resources, which is 
referred to as “mutual resource dependency” [28]. Furthermore, the contribution of resources over time 
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is crucial. It is assumed that future outcomes for actors will be clearer where actors are involved over 
several time steps, bridging to future outcomes. 
Second, the rules of the game, including sanctioning mechanisms, help to prevent stakeholders from 
withdrawing from the agreement and secure the protection of vulnerable stakeholders. We follow  
Arts et al. [25] in defining rules of the game as the unwritten constitution of the arrangement that 
guides the behaviour and interaction of actors and influence the strategic deployment of their 
resources. The presence of sanctioning mechanisms is assumed reduce uncertainty as these incentivize 
towards rule conform behaviour.  
Third, the uncertainty of future outcomes is reduced when actors share a discourse around the 
arrangement. The concept of discourse refers to “the views and narratives of the actors involved” [25]. 
Here, a discourse is understood as “a dominant interpretative scheme” by which meaning is given to 
the respective joint initiative [28]. Given the long duration of the jatropha institutional arrangements, 
“discourse” obtains the notion of a “vision”, which can have the potential to mobilise stakeholders [29]. 
However, a discourse can also imply persuasion, employing the “power of arguments” and defining 
what is legitimate behaviour [28]. Hence, the convergence of different discourses around the 
arrangement would keep the persistence of the institutional arrangement over time by reducing 
uncertainty. However, if the discourse is divergent, then uncertainty might increase. Long-time 
horizons are known to fail in evoking commitments [30], given that they involve a “range of 
uncontrollable and unpredictable factors operating in the future” [31]. Under such conditions, 
institutional arrangements are crafted to create time perspectives that bring added value to today’s 
risk-taking decisions [32]. 
Long-term profitability and short-term liquidity are important characteristics in a plantation’s 
planning [33]. Delay in investment return is a crucial aspect for planters with liquidity constraints [34]. 
Some actors in jatropha institutional arrangements (farmers, local government staff) focus on annual 
income revenue to cover their costs, especially when their yearly expenses are relatively high.  
For other actors (companies and central government), biofuel production from jatropha might only 
form a minor share of their total activities and budgets. Therefore, for them, the future income or 
general profitability of the project is more important in determining success. These diverging (time) 
perspectives in jatropha investments are to some extent comparable to other sectors; for instance, 
investment in forestry or orchards needs to deal with a long time horizon before returns capitalise, 
which is problematic for small forestry farmers [30,35].  
4. Analysis of Two Institutional Arrangements 
This section introduces and analyses the two jatropha projects—government driven and market 
driven institutional arrangements. Each case will be described by starting with the respective 
arrangement and its implementation, focusing on actors’ contributions, resource dependencies and the 
arrangement’s embedding in a discourse. Subsequently, the performance of each institutional 
arrangement will be presented in terms of the de facto planted area and realised biodiesel production. 
Finally, several lessons will be reflected from each case study.  
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4.1. Government Driven Arrangement: Sichuan Province 
4.1.1. Institutional Arrangement 
Within the Forestry-Oil-Integration Scheme, the long-term target for new jatropha plantations in 
Sichuan province is 600,000 ha by 2020, while the five-year target from 2007 onwards is 200,000 ha 
(interview Sichuan Forestry Administration). To achieve these targets, the Sichuan provincial 
government has set up an arrangement in which the company CNPC plays a pivotal role. CNPC is a 
financially independent state-owned company, developed out of the Ministry of Oil Industry in 1988 
as part of China’s development towards a market economy. However, CNPC still has close ties with 
the government, given that its leaders are appointed by the Chinese Communist Party. CNPC is 
considered as a ministry level state-owned company (hence, its highest leader is equal to a minister). 
The cooperation between CNPC and SFA as well as the Sichuan provincial government can be 
considered as a horizontal cooperation between different government sectors (see Arrow 1 in Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Jatropha project governance structure in Sichuan province. 
 
Arrow1 Horizontal Cooperation, Arrow 2 Administration Jurisdiction (appointment and financial resources 
decided by higher level), Arrow 3 Supervision (the lower level implements policy from higher level and is 
under higher level supervision), Arrow 4 Governing by Provision (the higher level governs the lower level  
by resource provision) (Kern and Alber, 2009) Arrow 5 cooperation based on agreement (the actors work 
together according to oral agreement or written contract). VC Village Committee, GOV Government,  
FA Forest Administration. 
These two parties signed an agreement on jatropha projects in 2006, according to which,  
both parties will work together to realise a “100,000 ton scale” jatropha based biodiesel pilot plant. 
The provincial Forestry Administration conducted an inventory of marginal land suitable to grow 
jatropha and the original distribution of wild jatropha, presenting the survey results to CNPC. Based on 
the results and a field trip, the provincial Forestry Administration and CNPC selected project plots and 
set a planting target for a five-year period. They agreed upon the realisation of jatropha plantations in 
Panzhihua City and Liangshan Minority Autonomous City. For these levels, the cooperation between 
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the branch of CNPC in charge of these projects and the two city governments can also be considered as 
a horizontal cooperation (see Arrow 1 in Figure 1). CNPC signed an agreement with Liangshan city 
government to plant an area of 120,000 ha jatropha demonstration plots, as well as with Panzhihua city 
government to plant an area of 80,000 ha jatropha demonstration plots. The realisation of this 
long-term goal was to be achieved in several steps. In 2007, Panzhihua and Liangshan governments 
were obliged to plant together 13,330 ha with jatropha and 16,670 ha in 2008. However, the new 
plantation did not continue after 2008 (interview Sichuan Forestry Administration officer). 
In these agreements, Liangshan and Panzhihua city governments would ensure forestland 
availability, promise to coordinate the implementation of plantations, i.e., to arrange labour and 
provide planting supervision, as well as organising the harvest, the collection of the seeds and 
transporting them to CNPC. Township Forestry Administrations would support the collection of seeds 
by farmers, while CNPC would pay a small fee to the Township Forestry Administration for this 
service. CNPC ensured providing subsidies for the plantation, as well as promising to purchase all 
jatropha seeds and process them to biofuel. CNPC would buy these seeds at a market price if it 
exceeded the guaranteed price of 3 RMB/kg. The collected seeds would be transported by the 
Township Forestry Administration to a simple extracting plant that produces the raw product, before 
being transported to a more centrally located refinery. Nanchong refinery of CNPC was a registered 
project at the NDRC, which consists of a 60,000 ton production line to extract the raw jatropha oil. 
The realisation of this agreement received support by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and CNPC, who 
each would contribute 50% to the planned budget. 
In conclusion, the institutional arrangement sets time-steps and concrete quantitative future 
outcomes. Furthermore, actors across the entire production chain are involved and contribute 
resources. We can assume that future outcomes of the agreement are rather certain. National 
government together with city and county/township governments contribute the most in terms of 
resources (see Table 4). 
For the implementation, the planting task was distributed downwards via the county and township 
governments to the village committee. In the terminology of Kern and Alber [36], the relationship 
presents governing by provision as the higher level governs the lower level by resource provision  
(see Arrow 4 in Figure 1). The Forestry Administrations at each level are in charge of implementation. 
The subsidies of the MOF had to be distributed via the respective county administration to the 
participants. In the four counties, the county Forestry Administration and the township government 
employed their access to those realising the plantation, i.e., they persuaded large (institutional) forest 
landholders and village committees. In turn, the village committees persuaded the villagers to take part 
in jatropha plantation by supplying seedlings, fertilisers, paying wages and promising that CNPC 
would purchase the final product with the help of the Township Forestry Administration. The persuasion 
of farmers applied economic arguments of increasing the villagers’ incomes. Costs for setting up 
jatropha plantations are covered by the subsidy of the MOF (3000 RMB/ha) and CNPC (3000 RMB/ha). 
During the implementation, subsidies only address expenses for the first year. 
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Table 4. Contribution of resources to government driven arrangement. 
Actor 
Resources contributed to arrangement 
Category Description Time dimension 
MOF Finance 
50% of cultivation investment 
(seeds, labour) in planned budget 
The subsidy of 2007 
distributed after plantation  
in 2007; 
The subsidy of 2008 
distributed in 2010 
Liangshan/Panzhihua 
governments 
Staff 
Staff for the coordination of 
jatropha plantation, seed harvest, 
collection * and transport; 
Technical service staff for jatropha 
cultivation 
Plantation period and  
harvest period 
 Infrastructure Transportation 
Before and during  
harvest period 
 Access Access to forestland 
Before and during  
plantation period 
County Forestry 
Administration/ 
township 
government 
Access 
Access to farmers: use of 
argumentative power for persuasion; 
Access to higher level: use of 
subsidies from MOF for persuasion; 
Access to CNPC 
Before and during  
plantation period; 
Before and during  
plantation period; 
Before and during plantation 
period, harvest period 
CNPC Finance 
50% of cultivation investment 
(seeds, labour) in planned budget; 
Purchase of all jatropha seeds at  
3 RMB/kg or higher (market price). 
The subsidy of 2007 
distributed after plantation  
in 2007; 
The subsidy of 2008  
was not paid 
Villagers Labour  
Plantation period and  
harvest period 
* Against a small fee by CNPC. 
4.1.2. Performance 
The planted area in 2007 was 14,667 ha, i.e., more than the target for that year; in 2008, 15,333 ha 
were planted, which was a little less than the original target. Overall, the sum of the two years’ 
plantations reached the annual targets. Out of the two sources of subsidies, MOF and CNPC, the MOF 
paid its subsidies to the provincial Department of Finance (DOF) after inspection. The money has been 
transferred to planters and employed farmers via the county Department of Finance and the Forestry 
Administrations. However, subsidies from CNPC for 2007 and 2008 did not arrive at the county level 
until 2010. For the start of the Forestry-Oil Integration Scheme, the county government and Forestry 
Administration paid this part of CNPC’s investment from their own resources. Hence, smallholders 
who were involved in the jatropha plantation of 2007 received the subsidy on time. However, the MOF 
subsidy for new jatropha plantations in the second year, due in 2008, was only distributed to the 
county Forestry Administration in 2010. The reason for this delay lies in the requirements for receiving 
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MOF subsidies, with the MOF stipulating that a jatropha plantation needs a contract with a pilot 
company, and that the enterprise needs to have a refinery in its vicinity. In the second year, CNPC 
withdrew from the project, with the construction of the Nanchong refinery also stopping after 2008, 
before it entered into the production stage (interview with Forestry Administration officer). This 
implied that farmers’ jatropha plantations did not have access to a refinery, which led to the MOF 
stopping financial flows. However, after farmers lobbied at the local Forestry Administration, and the 
latter lobbied at higher level Forestry Administration departments, subsidies were finally transferred to 
farmers. The national government eventually paid the subsidy and farmer wages could be paid, albeit 
with considerable delay. After withdrawing from the arrangement, CNPC did not pay the second year 
subsidy. Consequently, the local government and farmers stopped planting and cultivating jatropha.  
A county report [37] showed that the county Forestry Administration had a large debt due to their 
spending on seedlings and fertilisers, causing an absence of payments to large forestry farmers and 
their employees. This created conflicts between employed farmers and the local government. 
Due to low investments in intensive cultivation, the productivity and yield of jatropha is 
considerably lower than initially expected. Nowadays, jatropha plantations from the first and second 
year still exist. However, the average production each year is around 750 kg/ha, compared to the 
initially expected 4500 kg/ha. 
4.1.3. Lessons 
The Sichuan case is part of the Forestry-Oil Integration Scheme. The plan is embedded in the 
general governmental strategy on measures for combating global warming, building on forests’ ecological 
functions and the contribution of renewable (energy) resources to sustainable development [38–40]. 
Hence, jatropha is promoted to combat global warming and increase renewable energy sources. 
Nonetheless, for Forestry Administrations at the provincial, county and township level, reporting on 
political achievements, such as plantation targets, is crucial. For the County Forestry Administration 
and the Township Forestry Administration, the present plantation and costs have priority over future 
seeds and biodiesel. For village leaders and villagers, present cash income is most important, to cover 
their daily life and consumption. As a result, the plantation discontinued as without the flow of subsidy 
current net costs for villagers, village leaders and the Township Forestry Administration were high; 
future gains had much less priority. 
In the case in Sichuan, the local government and farmers seem to be in a situation of mutual 
resource dependency, according to which the government depends on farmers’ willingness to contribute 
with labour, while the farmers depend on the government for access to programmes and monetary 
resources. Both parties lose future options of cooperation if they default on the arrangement. However, 
CNPC is not such a place-based actor and can seek future options in other places. Compared to the 
local government and farmers, CNPC is less resource dependent on the other actors and is more 
flexible to step out and move resources to other places and investments. Due to the absence of mutual 
resources dependency with CNPC, the uncertainty of future outcomes could not be reduced. 
The rules of the game of government driven arrangements are characterised by the embeddedness in 
the present organisation of the Chinese economy, i.e., a sort of market orientation with strong 
government characteristics and top-down administrative planning and regulation. The withdrawal of 
CNPC from the plantation and the closure of their Nanchong refinery can be partly attributed to a 
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leadership change in CNPC. While the former leader was enthusiastic about jatropha and showed 
commitment and vision, the new CNPC leader was hardly interested and terminated subsidies, a situation 
that is not uncommon in China [41]. Furthermore, the cooperation between the city government, the 
Forestry Administration and CNPC was based on a fairly general agreement, without any provisions 
concerning punishment in the case of non-compliance, as opposed to a standard contract with legal 
power. The agreement was quite vulnerable to external shocks.  
In conclusion, farmers and the local government, who depend on subsidy, quit to grow jatropha 
when there was no financial support from the state-owned company and the national government.  
Lack of sustained commitment from the state-owned company resulted in failure of this government 
driven project. Farmers seem to be the weakest actor as they had no means to sanction noncompliant 
behaviour from the state-owned company. Although, the low productivity of jatropha may have played 
a role in project discontinuation, there is not sufficient production information to draw any lasting 
conclusions in this regard. 
4.2. Market Driven Arrangement: Guangxi Province 
4.2.1. Institutional Arrangement 
In Guangxi, private companies rather than state-owned oil companies initiated jatropha plantations. 
Guangxi Zhilian Renewable Energy Company (GZREC) was the largest and most notable private 
energy company involved in jatropha-based biofuel production. GZREC was set up in 2007, 
cooperating with the International Jatropha Association, specialised in jatropha genetic research, 
seedling cultivation, jatropha forest development and biodiesel production (interview with Guangxi 
Forestry Administration officer). The company started plantation by using a contract farming scheme 
with the village committee. 
The company started plantations in Pingguo County, due to its large area of marginal forestland  
and long history of jatropha. GZREC came into contact with the rather impoverished Burong 
administration village in Pingguo County through an introduction by the office of poverty alleviation. 
After initial contacts, the company negotiated directly with the village leader. The village leader 
subsequently investigated several jatropha biofuel companies in Nanning city (the capital of Guangxi 
province), checking information on the internet concerning the company and biofuel production.  
Only then did he decide to cooperate with GZREC. The private company decided on the planting area 
after discussing with the village committee. Hence, the two actors had a vision of feasible future 
outcomes in terms of the planted area. The company and Burong village committee signed a written 
contract; accordingly, the cooperation between the company and villagers can be seen as contract 
farming, which is a market arrangement (see Figure 2). This contract arranged that the village would 
supply land and coordinate labour, while the company would supply seedlings, fertilisers, compensate 
for labour costs and provide technical services. The company agreed to offer basic labour wages at 
around 30 RMB per person per day. Moreover, the company also agreed to buy the seeds at a 
guaranteed price, and if the market price was higher than the guaranteed price, they would buy the 
seeds at the higher market price. For the realisation of the agreement, GZREC applied for a subsidy 
from the MOF (interview with village leader). This arrangement did not involve much risk for the 
farmers, while income generation was secured for the initial labour investment. 
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Figure 2. Jatropha contract farming scheme in Guangxi province. 
 
The village leader informed the farmers about the technology, market and policies, compiling  
a handbook. In order to involve farm households in jatropha plantation and cultivation, the village 
committee and secretary persuaded farmers to participate. Furthermore, the village committee also 
gave away its control over the use rights of collectively-owned forestland and distributed the land 
among the farmers to incentivise their participation and organise jatropha planting. Finally, the village 
committee convinced farmers that the company could be trusted. The farmers were highly motivated 
because the private company and village committee took many measures (see also Table 5 for the 
contribution of resources). 
Table 5. Contribution of resources to the market driven arrangement. 
Actor 
Resources contributed to arrangement 
Category Description Time 
Village leaders Staff Coordination of labour Plantation period and harvest period 
 Access 
Access to forestland; 
Access to farmers: use of 
argumentative power for persuasion; 
Access to company 
Before plantation; 
Plantation period and harvest period  
Before and during plantation period, 
harvest period 
 
Social 
capital 
Trust of farmers in village 
government 
Plantation period and harvest period 
Company Finance 
Production costs  
(seedlings, fertiliser, labour cost); 
Purchase of all jatropha seeds at  
3 RMB/kg or a higher market price. 
Plantation period; 
Harvest period 
 Access 
Access to market; 
Access to media 
Harvest period; 
Plantation period 
 Staff 
Company staff provides technical 
service to villagers 
Plantation period and harvest period 
Villagers Labour  Plantation period and harvest period 
 Expertise 
Know-how of jatropha cultivation 
and harvest 
Plantation period and harvest period 
 
Land use 
right * 
 In the beginning of the plantation 
* Provided by the village committee. 
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To establish a joint vision and discourse, the company also invited television to broadcast this 
project to a wider public during the planting phase, which increased confidence and trust among the 
villagers (interview with village leader). Furthermore, the company organised an introductory meeting 
and seminar, inviting village leaders from other areas and explaining the economic value of jatropha, 
the technology of jatropha plantation and the cooperative arrangement between the private company 
and village committee, in order to attract further participation. GZREC planned to grow 3333 ha in 
Pingguo County, and started to grow jatropha on 133 ha in Burong village in 2007. The private 
company offered important resources and attracted more participation through media and a seminar. 
This market driven arrangement was based on market opportunity and economic interest. The 
private company at that time envisaged a market chance and promising bioenergy industry support by 
government subsidies. The village leader wanted to spur rural development by increasing employment 
and household incomes. Villagers need continuous income streams and are interested in quickly 
improving their living conditions.  
4.2.2. Performance 
At the beginning of 2008, around four months after the initial planting of 133 ha, frost destroyed the 
young jatropha forest. The programme was not continued after the frost and the hills were left barren. 
The company disappeared without fulfilling the contract, and hence the farmers did not receive any 
wages. Despite a written contract between the village committee and company, it was difficult to 
follow-up on this as the company disappeared and the village committee was not capable to effectuate 
the contract before court. 
One reason why GZREC withdrew after the frost was that it expected (in vain) to receive a subsidy 
from the MOF. According to the “Management instruction on financial subsidy supporting the crops 
bases which produce Renewable Energy and Biochemical products” published by MOF, jatropha 
plantations only receive a subsidy if they reach 20,000 ha plantation and have an area of at least  
33.3 ha nursery fields. Even if a refinery was under construction, GZREC did not qualify for the 
subsidies. Therefore, the frost might have simply been the trigger to quit the project. 
4.2.3. Lessons 
In the case of Guangxi, extreme weather conditions—not unique in China—formed a reason for the 
private company to withdraw the plantation. The significant factor for the failure in Guangxi was the 
strict requirements for subsidies from the MOF, i.e., in terms of the size of plantation area and the 
requirement to have a refinery close to the plantation, which resulted in the private company’s failure 
to receive subsidies.  
In a market driven arrangement, even with contracts, the private company in Guangxi was also able 
to withdraw. This case reflects the state of the rule of (contract) law in transitional China, where the 
legal system is underdeveloped. There is insufficient coordination and supervision to legally sanction 
private (and state) actors not behaving according to written contracts. The lack of involvement of 
higher governmental levels and the non-fulfilment of company promises in contract farming reinforced 
the difficulties of jatropha plantation, not unlike in other Asian cases [12]. 
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In conclusion, a private company chose to withdraw triggered by an extreme weather event and 
unclear conditions of financial support. The lack of insufficient coordination and supervision made 
legal sanctions impossible. Support for private companies through subsidies from the central government 
based on transparent conditions and disaster insurance services from insurance companies [42] could 
reduce the probability of their early drop out in a market arrangement. 
5. Conclusions 
Given that jatropha is generally known for surviving on marginal land and under harsh conditions, 
it was considered as a promising fuel stock by the Chinese government. Expectations that it would not 
compete with food crops on agricultural land and could make use of the country’s large marginal land 
endowment have been high. However, despite the government’s promotion of jatropha, it did not build 
up a robust market environment. The rather late formulation of standards for biodiesel (especially  
the B5) and the absence of mandatory targets for biodiesel illustrate the underdeveloped biodiesel 
policy and regulation during the first decade of the new millennium in China. Nonetheless, through 
programmes and plans, the government devised some investment environment. Therefore, China also 
reflects the case of other developing countries where policies are not always well developed but 
programmes are devised for establishing a new sector [43]. 
The analysis of the jatropha biofuel projects and plantation indicates that an ambitious plan turns 
out to be stagnating. This article has focused on examining the main institutional reasons behind the 
stagnation of jatropha plantation. Accordingly, two arrangements have been identified, namely a 
government driven and market driven arrangement. However, as our case studies show, the 
institutional arrangements within programmes of two failed projects have been rather weak. In order to 
circumvent the risks of failure discussed in this analysis, jatropha, like other perennial plantations, 
requires institutional arrangements that keep stakeholders of the biodiesel production chain involved 
over a long time period. However, the time perspectives do not match across governmental levels and 
towards non-governmental stakeholders in the two cases. In the government driven arrangement, the 
state-owned enterprise has also not been reliable in devising future perspectives in this arrangement, 
while sanctioning rules have not been effective in preventing this enterprise’s withdrawal. Hence, the 
mutual resource dependency of the local government and farmers in this case does not reduce 
uncertainty, due to the high dependency on the less place-based actor. Moreover, whereas the national 
government employs a rather comprehensive discourse around the use of forests for biodiesel 
production and shows a long-term perspective, our analysis illustrates that short-term incentives and 
immediate benefits will be more relevant for local governments and farmers involved in a government 
driven arrangement. For the case of the market driven arrangement, ministry’s subsidy requirements 
for jatropha plantations (refinery and area size) make such small-scale private initiatives like that of 
Guangxi nearly impossible. The aforementioned sanctioning rules are also less favourable to this 
arrangement. In conclusion, both the government driven and market driven arrangements in place have 
failed to establish sustainable commitments with different actors over a long time span.  
An institution is any structure or mechanism of social order governing the behaviour of a set of 
individuals within a given community. Basically, institutions always matter, as without institutions no 
social order is possible. However, in these cases the specific design of the institutions did not give the 
desired result, hence the institutional design was inadequate for the goals to be obtained. These 
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insights from the cases show the importance of adequate institutional design to secure the success and 
continuation of jatropha projects. 
Several lessons can be drawn from our analysis. In order to create a sustained market environment, 
a better implementation of the rules of law and sanctioning rules to prevent withdrawal of actors is 
necessary for both government and market driven arrangements. Furthermore, jatropha plantations 
need strong and continuous financial support from government agencies and companies to provide 
shared long-term perspectives and reimburse smallholders according to their annual time horizons in 
both arrangements. Additionally, mandatory blending requirements provide crucial framework 
conditions for both arrangements, in terms of increasing planning certainty. In addition, potential 
measures to enhance shared long-term perspectives in market driven arrangements might relate to 
hazard insurance services that could strengthen the commitment of market parties. Furthermore, the 
independent monitoring of contract farming and legal services to farmers is significant to create 
reliable market relations. In government driven arrangements, the effectuation of sanctions towards 
higher-level administrations (or the CNPC in this case) seems to be an issue to address, particularly 
given other actors’ dependency on their resources. A further obstacle is the difference in time 
perspectives across local and higher level government administrations.  
Despite having selected two cases that are representative for different types of institutional 
arrangements, we cannot provide a full picture of China’s biodiesel production from jatropha through a 
large survey. Furthermore, technical constraints to jatropha production are not dealt with within this 
article’s focus on institutional arrangements and time perspectives, despite clearly playing an 
important role for the success of this biodiesel crop. However, this article brings a new understanding 
of how to increase the resilience to the consequences of technical uncertainties, and ultimately, how to 
support the long-term success of jatropha biofuel development. Based on the findings of this article, 
we believe sustained commitments with different actors over a long time are important constituents for 
the future study concerning the success of jatropha plantations. 
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